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THE PHILIP D. REED LECTURE SERIES
PANEL DISCUSSION
THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE
AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE:
WHAT IS THE PROPER BALANCE?*
MODERATOR
Daniel J. Capra
Philip D. Reed Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law
PANELISTS
Hon. Robert D. Sack
Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Hon. John D. Bates
Judge, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
Douglas Letter, Esq.
Terrorism Litigation Counsel, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice
Ben Wizner, Esq.
Litigation Director, ACLU National Security Project
PROF. CAPRA: Thanks for coming tonight. My name is Dan Capra. I
am the Philip Reed Chair at Fordham Law School. What you are attending
tonight is a Reed Panel presentation, a yearly presentation on issues that are
of interest to the federal courts.
The Reed Chair was established in 1996 to promote discussion about
issues facing the federal judiciary, and I have been the Chair since it was
instituted. Last year’s program was about private information in court
filings and how to protect private identifier information from internet
access, which is a very large program here.

* This Panel Discussion was held on March 23, 2011, at Fordham University School of
Law. The text of the Panel Discussion transcript has been lightly edited.
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Philip Reed, Jr., who was responsible for establishing the Chair, passed
away. I want to take this opportunity to express my sadness at his passing
and to say how important and valued his support has been to me and to the
Chair here at Fordham.
The proceedings of the yearly Reed Program are transcribed and
published in the Fordham Law Review. This year’s Law Review members
have provided outstanding assistance and have been absolutely fantastic to
work with—not only on the Reed Program, but on everything I do around
here. I would particularly like to thank this year’s Editor-in-Chief, Alyssa
Beaver, and the Symposia Editor, Mari Byrne, for their outstanding work
and their outstanding assistance. Thank you.
On the topic tonight, I am just going to provide a few introductory
remarks and then I am going to provide introductions to the panelists and
then I am going to let it go. The state secrets privilege is what we are going
to be talking about tonight. Under the state secrets doctrine, the United
States may prevent the disclosure of information in a judicial proceeding if
there is a reasonable danger to national security.
The fountainhead case on the privilege is United States v. Reynolds, 1 in
which an Air Force B-29 bomber had crashed during testing of secret
electronic equipment and civilian observers were killed. Their widows sued
the United States and they sought discovery of certain Air Force documents
related to the crash, and the Air Force refused to disclose the documents and
filed a claim of privilege, contending that the plane had been on a highly
secret mission of the Air Force and disclosure of the materials would
seriously hamper national security. 2
That got to the Supreme Court. The Court sustained the Air Force’s
refusal to disclose the documents, noting that the privilege that was invoked
was well established in common law all the way back to the Aaron Burr
treason trial. 3 The Reynolds Court reviewed a long line of the decisions,
including a case which may come up in the discussion tonight, Totten v.
United States, 4 where the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of an
action for breach of a secret espionage contract. So it was a breach of
contract action saying, “You did not pay me for my espionage,” which
obviously raises some state secrets issues. The Court in the Totten case
held that prosecuting that matter would inevitably lead to the disclosure of
matters which the law regards as confidential.
So it is fair to state that the state secrets privilege was rarely invoked in
the period between Reynolds and 9/11, but since 9/11 it has been invoked
much more frequently. Civil cases involving state secrets, for example, go
to contentions about illegal rendition, claims for torture, illegal surveillance.
All have been court decisions involving the state secrets privilege, and I
assume that our panelists will be talking about them tonight.

1.
2.
3.
4.

345 U.S. 1 (1953).
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 7 & n.18, 9 & n.24.
92 U.S. 105 (1875).
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A court faced with a state secrets privilege question is required to use a
three-part analysis. I will just go quickly through those parts. The court
must find that the procedural requirements for invoking the state secrets
privilege have been satisfied, and there are significant procedural
requirements. The court must decide whether the information sought to be
protected qualifies as privileged under the state secrets doctrine. If that
finding is made, it means that the information cannot be used. There is no
balance of interests. It is not a qualified privilege; it is an absolute
privilege. A court’s determination that a piece of evidence is a privileged
state secret removes it from the proceedings entirely.
And then, to me, the most interesting question: What happens then? Can
the case proceed? There are difficult issues of determining whether a case
can proceed after an invocation of the state secrets doctrine. The question
is: can the case be prosecuted without that state secret or is there a problem
of litigating the case that comes so close to the state secrets that even
without the state secrets information there is a threat to national security
based on the prosecution of the matter?
One of the problems of administering the state secrets privilege is that
arguments must be made about it and about the sensitivity of information
and the risk of disclosure and the like, without access to the information
itself. So there are difficult questions that need to be answered about how a
court goes about evaluating a claim of state secrets.
It is not inevitable that the court would use—in fact, it is not always
permitted to use—an in camera proceeding. In camera proceedings have to
have some kind of finding before they can be held. But then, when there is
an in camera proceeding, both parties—especially the party that seeks the
information—are under a difficulty in terms of trying to argue that there is
no problem with the information when in fact they do not know what the
information is.
So those are the conundrums that we are going to be talking about
tonight. To discuss these important and timely issues we have, I have to
say, one of the best panels that we have ever put together here, with
extensive experience in thinking and writing about these matters. Their
complete bios are found in the materials, but I am going to summarize them
here in the order of their speaking.
First, Judge Robert Sack, who has been a judge on the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals since 1998. He took senior status in August of 2009. He
has had some pretty good clerks, specifically my colleagues Jeanne Fromer
and Richard Squire. Judge Sack graduated from the University of
Rochester and Columbia Law School. He clerked for Judge Arthur Lane of
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. He
practiced with Patterson Belknap and later Gibson Dunn. During 1974, he
served as Associate Special Counsel and Senior Associate Special Counsel
for the House of Representatives’ impeachment inquiry staff. If you think
back in your history, you can figure out which impeachment that was.
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Judge Sack is an expert in national and international press law and is the
author of Sack on Defamation 5 and co-author of Advertising and
Commercial Speech: A First Amendment Guide.6 He has authored a
number of opinions for the Second Circuit on the state secrets privilege, and
he is a member of the Board of Visitors of Columbia Law School and a
Lecturer in Law at the School.
Judge John Bates was appointed to the District Court for the District of
Columbia in 2001. He graduated from Wesleyan University and the
University of Maryland School of Law. He served in the Army, including a
tour in Vietnam. Judge Bates clerked for Judge Roszel C. Thomsen of the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland, practiced at
Steptoe & Johnson, served as an Assistant United States Attorney for the
District of Columbia, and as Chief of the Civil Division of the U.S.
Attorney’s Office from 1987 to 1997, and practiced thereafter at the
Washington, D.C. law firm of Miller & Chevalier. Judge Bates serves as a
member of the Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and
Case Management. In 2006, he was appointed by the Chief Justice to serve
as a judge of the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court—the
FISA Court—and he has been the presiding Judge of that court since May
2009.
Ben Wizner is the Litigation Director of the ACLU’s National Security
Project. He is a graduate of Harvard College and New York University
School of Law. Mr. Wizner was a law clerk to the Honorable Stephen
Reinhardt of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. He has
litigated several post-9/11 civil liberties cases in which the government has
invoked the state secrets privilege, including El-Masri v. United States,7
which was a challenge to the abduction and detention of a German citizen;
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 8 which ended up in an en banc
opinion in the Ninth Circuit, a suit against a private aviation services
company for facilitating the CIA’s rendition; Edmonds v. Department of
Justice, 9 which was a whistleblower retaliation suit on behalf of an FBI
translator; and Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 10 a suit challenging the government’s
authority to use lethal force against a U.S. citizen. He has written widely on
issues relating to detention, military commissions, and accountability for
torture. He also appeared regularly in the media, before Congress, and
traveled several times to Guantanamo to monitor the military commission
trials.
Doug Letter is the Terrorism Litigation Counsel for the Civil Division of
the Department of Justice, a graduate of Columbia University and the
5. ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS
(4th ed. 2010).
6. P. CAMERON DEVORE & ROBERT D. SACK, ADVERTISING AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH:
A FIRST AMENDMENT GUIDE (1999).
7. 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007).
8. 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011).
9. 161 F. App’x 6 (D.C. Cir.), aff’g 323 F. Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2004), cert. denied,
546 U.S. 1031 (2005).
10. 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010).
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University of California Law School—one year behind me, actually, and
we have never met to this day. At the DOJ, Doug has presented oral
argument at the Supreme Court and in more than 200 cases in the federal
courts of appeals. His areas of expertise include antiterrorism, separation of
powers and presidential authority, national security, foreign affairs, and
ethical rules for Justice Department attorneys. He successfully represented
the United States in many cases involving these kinds of issues. For the
past six years he has taught a course on national security at George
Washington University Law School. He has been a lecturer at various
schools, including Yale, Michigan, and American Law Schools, and the
United States Naval Academy. Doug serves as the Department of Justice
member on the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Appellate
Rules.
Our protocol tonight is to have the speakers speak in that order and make
a presentation on some aspect. I imposed no rules, as far as I can tell, on
what they were going to talk about. We are going to have them all talk,
make statements, and then we will have a general discussion, and we will
leave some time for questions and comments from the audience.
I would like to call on Judge Sack. Thank you very much, Judge, for
coming.
JUDGE SACK: I am very glad to see my law clerks here, Jeanne Fromer
and Richard Squire. As you are well aware, I am a great admirer indeed of
both of you.
I am reminded at this moment of the elementary school student who was
given a history test that went something like this: “Tell everything you
know about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.” He answered, “I know
nothing about it,” and he got an A, because after all, his answer was entirely
correct.
I am not an expert on state secrets. Few Court of Appeals judges are. As
best as I can recall, I have written on three state secrets cases. Two of them
were incarnations of the same case actually, in which, both times, I
dissented because the district court did not, wrongly I thought, even reach
the state secrets question. And there was one in which our panel agreed that
under the circumstances the plaintiff’s lawyer was not entitled to examine
allegedly secret documents in order to help him establish that they were not
state secrets.
So I am not engaging in mock self-deprecation. Judges should be experts
in judging. But as a general matter we are not, and are not expected to be,
experts on the subject matter of the civil cases that come before us, at least
not before those cases are in fact heard. In many instances, we have little
previous knowledge about a subject because it has not been relevant to what
we have been tasked to do.
To choose one of any number of examples, our court hears a vast number
of immigration cases. Many involve asylum seekers from Fujian Province
in China. I would be willing to wager that most of my colleagues have no
idea where Fujian Province is or why the large flow of immigrants comes
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from there. They will be informed by counsel when, if ever, those facts are
thought by counsel to make a difference in a particular case.
I have read dozens of transcripts of asylum hearings where the alien is
testifying in translation. I have no deep understanding of how that fact
affects the immigration judge’s ability to make reliable credibility
assessments that affect, often determine, the outcome of the hearing. If the
issue becomes material in the course of an appeal, the lawyers will try to
explain it to me.
And so I think it is with state secrets, even district court judges who first
hear the state secrets question. My knowledge, like theirs, is limited.
So I thought I would use these few minutes to talk, not about my slim
judicial experience handling states secrets questions, but about a case that
predates my judgeship by more than twenty-five years and that, strictly
speaking, was not a state secrets case at all. It may nonetheless contain a
message or two for us for this evening.
We are about to mark the fortieth anniversary of the Pentagon Papers
case. 11 The issue was prior restraint whereas the subject tonight is judicial
interaction with state secrets. But it seems to me that there is a striking
similarity between the challenges facing Judge Gurfein in deciding forty
years ago whether to continue an injunction against the New York Times’s
publication of the Papers and a judge in 2011 deciding whether documents
are covered by the state secrets doctrine so as to disallow their use in civil
litigation.
I must give a nod at the outset to Professor David Rudenstine of Cardozo
Law School, whose 1994 book on the Pentagon Papers case, The Day the
Presses Stopped, is the classic account. 12 He was kind enough recently,
and entirely coincidentally, to send me a copy of the once-sealed transcript
of the June 21st in camera hearing before the Pentagon Papers district court
that I will discuss in a moment. Now, I say it was once sealed, but I say
that hopefully, because if it is still sealed, Professor Rudenstine and I are in
a heap of trouble.
Surely, even these many years afterwards, I need not rehearse for you
much about the facts of the legendary case: the leaking to the Times and the
Washington Post by Daniel Ellsberg of all but four volumes of a fortyseven volume Defense Department history of American involvement in
Vietnam; the New York Times’ resolution to publish excerpts despite
opposition within and without the paper and warnings that publication
might violate the Espionage Act; the government’s success in obtaining a
temporary restraining order from the Southern District of New York against
such publication, but only after three installments had already been
published by the Times.
Several days later, after the third installment appeared, the district court
turned to the issue of whether to preliminarily enjoin the Times from their
11. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
12. DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE DAY THE PRESSES STOPPED: A HISTORY OF THE PENTAGON
PAPERS CASE (1996).
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further publication of the papers. There was a temporary order in place
containing the restriction, but the question was injunction.
The protagonists for present purposes were the U.S. Attorney for the
Southern District of New York, Whitney North Seymour, for the
government; Yale Law Professor Alexander Bickel for the Times; and
Judge Murray Gurfein, a moderately conservative New York Republican
before whom the request for an injunction had been made. Legend at least
has it that this was the first case Judge Gurfein heard upon taking the
federal bench and the first appearance of the seasoned and celebrated
academic Professor Bickel as an advocate in a federal court anywhere. The
substantive portion of the hearings was held behind closed doors for the
obvious purpose of protecting any sensitive material that might be perused
and discussed during the course of those hearings.
The pivotal question as Judge Gurfein saw it was simple if not easy:
would publication of one or more of the Pentagon Papers be likely seriously
to harm the national security of the United States?
The government’s principal overall position, as I understand it, was that
it did not have to answer that question. Once the Executive Branch had by
executive order branded documents secret, the documents were secret as a
matter of law. They could therefore not be published without, in effect,
permission of the Executive Branch, and the courts were obligated to
enforce the secrecy by injunction—prior restraint—on publication if
necessary.
Incidentally, to prove that there is indeed nothing new under the sun,
Judge Gurfein in the early course of trying to elicit explicit testimony as to
the harm that might befall the United States from publication, said:
Every day on television I can find out almost the entire order of battle
of the United States Army and Marines, isn’t that true? “I am here with
the First Division at so and so and we are doing this[.]”
Warfare today is different from what it was in the days when there was
real security. Everybody and his brother knows what everybody is doing
today. 13

This was 1971. He was referring to television. But if you substitute the
word “blogs” for “television,” a Southern District judge might have made a
similar observation just this morning.
In any event, up until the hearing began, Judge Gurfein seemed to be
very much inclined to grant the injunction. All he appeared to be looking
for to support its issuance was evidence that further public disclosure would
do serious damage to legitimate American security interests. But the
government witnesses did not provide any such evidence. Professor Bickel
was there to tell the court not that prior restraints were necessarily
unconstitutional, but that in light of the First Amendment interests at stake,
a strong showing of serious harm to the national interest was required.
13. Transcript of In Camera Proceedings at 1, United States v. N.Y. Times Co., 328 F.
Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (No. 71 Civ. 2662).

8

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

Crucially, no such showing had been made. After several hours of
testimony and argument, Judge Gurfein came to agree. He ruled that a
further injunction was, under the circumstances, unwarranted.
Just nine days later—nine days after the district court opinion—the
Supreme Court of the United States famously agreed, issuing nine separate
opinions, three of them dissents.
But oft forgotten is the tenth opinion, a brief per curiam for the majority.
It did not state new or bold constitutional doctrine. It did not contain
original mellifluous prose. The Court said just this: “‘Any system of prior
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity,’” 14 citing a 1963 case 15 and a 1931 case,
Near v. Minnesota. 16 The government “thus carries a heavy burden of
showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint,” 17 quoting a
1976 opinion. 18
The Supreme Court concluded: “The District Court for the Southern
District of New York in the New York Times case . . . held that the
Government had not met that burden. We agree.”19 That was it.
The Pentagon Papers case was profoundly important for many reasons.
But the holding of the Supreme Court, I think, was simply that the United
States did not prove as a fact before the district court that the Papers
contained genuine “state secrets” (or whatever they were referred to by the
Court at the time), and that therefore no injunction was constitutionally
permissible.
I draw from the Pentagon Papers experience several possible lessons for
the handling of state secrets in federal courts today—at least in civil cases,
which of course the Pentagon Papers case was.
First, and perhaps most important, it is the constitutionally ordained role
of judges, amateurs though we may be, to decide in a variety of
circumstances whether executive claims of the need for secrecy to protect
national security are justified.
The Pentagon Papers is one example. But fast-forward—to use a term
from the age of tape recordings—just three years. In July 1974, Chief
Justice Burger observed for a unanimous Supreme Court that the Nixon
White House tapes were
sought by one official of the Executive Branch within the scope of his
express authority; [they were] resisted by the Chief Executive on the
ground of its duty to preserve the confidentiality of the communications of

14. Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 714 (per curiam) (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
15. Bantam Books, Inc., 372 U.S. 58.
16. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
17. Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 714 (quoting Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402
U.S. 415, 419 (1971)).
18. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558, 592 (1976).
19. Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 714.
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the President. Whatever the correct answer on the merits, these issues are
“of a type which are traditionally justiciable.” 20

In other words, whether the tapes were required to remain confidential in
the interest of national security, the Supreme Court concluded, was a
question for the courts, not the Executive Branch of government. The
Supreme Court then decided that question in the negative. As a result, the
so-called “smoking gun” tape became public and the President was forced
from office less than three weeks later.
The second lesson I draw is that smart judges, which Judge Gurfein was,
can be pretty good at deciding these issues despite their lack of preexisting
expertise.
There is broad consensus that under uniquely difficult
circumstances, Judge Gurfein got the national security issue right.
Publication of the papers did no serious lasting damage to the United States.
Erwin Griswold, then Solicitor General, argued the case for the
government. He commented eighteen years later, “I have never seen any
trace of a threat to the national security from the publication [of the Papers].
Indeed, I have never seen it even suggested that there was such an actual
threat.” 21
Third, perhaps ironically, it seems to me notable that the judiciary is, for
reasons that we can discuss at another time, one of the more leak-resistant
of government institutions. In that regard it is well qualified to review
secrets. It is said that during the Pentagon Papers proceedings the Papers
themselves were spread out on a table night and day for the entirety of the
proceedings in Judge Gurfein’s chambers. There were no extraordinary
security procedures taken to safeguard them. And yet it was, after all,
Daniel Ellsberg, a government contractor, who provided the Papers to the
New York Times and the Washington Post. It was not Judge Gurfein and it
was not his law clerk or another member of his or the court’s staff.
Fourth, and penultimately, it seems to me that making the papers
available to Judge Gurfein for his review was absolutely necessary for him
to address and answer the question at hand. Since the Supreme Court’s
1953 Reynolds opinion, to which you were referred by Professor Capra in
his introduction, 22 and as I understand it still to be enforced, such review by
the district court in a state secrets context is contingent, not guaranteed.
The Reynolds Court declined to “go so far as to say that the [district]
court may automatically require a complete disclosure to the judge before
the claim of privilege will be accepted in any case.” 23 I think the Pentagon
Papers experience suggests that in that respect the Reynolds Court had it
wrong; Third Circuit Judge Maris, his court, and the Supreme Court
dissenters had it right. The judicial role can rarely be properly exercised
without a judicial review of the allegedly privileged material.
20. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 697 (1974) (citing United States v. ICC, 337
U.S. 426, 430 (1949)).
21. Erwin N. Griswold, Secrets Not Worth Keeping: The Courts and Classified
Information, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1989, at A25.
22. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
23. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953).
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Fifth and last, much was gained in the Pentagon Papers proceedings by
the preservation of the adversary system in the otherwise closed hearings
before the judge. The Times was represented and fully participated. It is
arguable that the Pentagon Papers proceedings, without advocates for both
sides present in the court, would have foundered. To be sure, the Pentagon
Papers proceedings were rather peculiar in this context, because the persons
arguing against secrecy already had the secrets; they already had the
Pentagon Papers. They were seeking not access but the ability to publish
them. I think, though, that Pentagon Papers teaches more broadly that we
should not be quick to abandon the adversary system in state secrets judicial
proceedings. The amateur judge needs it.
Perhaps there are reasons why the lawyer for the non-government party
cannot participate—the danger that such participation alone will itself
endanger the secrets. But there are presumably other people—non-party
lawyers acting as amici, experts with relevant expertise fully cleared for
access to the documents in question—who can participate in aid of the
court, someone available with sufficient knowledge to question the
government’s assertions if necessary.
Put it this way. If I was a district court judge and was told that the
continued secrecy of a complex drawing was an enormously sensitive state
secret, I would very much like to have someone not aligned with the
government available to participate in that hearing before me. Not because
I doubt the need for the government to keep secrets—of course it
sometimes may. And I do not doubt—at least I have not been given any
reason to doubt—the good faith of the government in declaring material to
contain a state secret.
But my expert in this hypothetical case before me as a district court judge
might point out some things that I just would not know—for example, that a
version of the diagram in question often appeared in first-year college
physics texts, or that the name “Goldberg,” the illustrator’s signature
beneath the illustration in question, referred not to the late Stanley
Goldberg, an expert on nuclear physics, but to the late Rube Goldberg, who
I suspect had no such experience.
In any event, I thought I would raise these matters for your consideration.
PROF. CAPRA: Thank you, Judge Sack. Judge Bates.
JUDGE BATES: Perhaps it will be no surprise that my remarks as a
district judge will be a little more practically oriented and focused on how
to handle a case, which is something that I have some experience with but
remain, in Judge Sack’s words, an amateur.
It is an understatement to say that the state secrets privilege is the subject
of continuing academic and political debate. One area of controversy is the
historic origin of the privilege. Is it a common law evidentiary privilege, or
has it evolved from constitutional roots? It may be a bit of both. The
Supreme Court’s seminal decision, referred to by Judge Sack, is the United

2011]

STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE

11

States v. Nixon case 24 on executive privilege, which certainly points in the
direction of some constitutional origin for the privilege. 25
That examination, of course, draws one into separation of powers issues
regarding the respective roles of the Executive Branch, the Legislative
Branch, and the Judicial Branch in identifying the precise contours of the
state secrets privilege and then applying it.
There are always pending efforts in the Congress to promulgate statutes
or rules governing the assertion of state secrets privilege. There are today,
and there were as far back as the 1970s with the consideration of proposed
Federal Rule of Evidence 509, which would have defined and set guidelines
for application of the privilege. Those efforts often spring from a
congressional assessment that state secrets is an evidentiary privilege of
common law origin.
The Executive Branch, of course, tends to stress the constitutional
underpinnings of the privilege, deriving from the President’s Article II
powers, and would generally reserve to itself a greater role in claiming and
applying the state secrets privilege.
Another current debate is whether the privilege has been invoked more
frequently recently or by one administration as compared to other
administrations. Given the post-9/11 efforts by the United States against
terrorism and threats of terrorism, it is not surprising that we would see
more frequent assertions of state secrets over the past decade. Certainly,
settings such as extraordinary rendition or warrantless surveillance, or even
the alleged targeted killing of U.S. citizens abroad, have given rise to
several recent and controversial assertions of the state secrets privilege.
Today I am going to try to stay clear of such issues and instead focus for
a few minutes on equally difficult issues related to adjudicating cases
involving state secrets claims. That said, my comments may well touch on
the current dispute over whether the state secrets privilege is properly
asserted early in a case—often to achieve dismissal of the case—or instead
should just be an evidentiary privilege with its consequences for the case
determined only after a plaintiff has been allowed to present all nonprivileged evidence.
Let me begin with a few preliminary observations. First, this is still
largely uncharted territory, and the cases actually resolving state secrets
claims remain relatively few. Indeed, the Supreme Court has had very little
to say on this subject. The 1953 decision in United States v. Reynolds 26 is
the only Supreme Court case to fully explore a state secrets claim other than
the cases derived from the 1875 decision in Totten v. United States, 27 where
the very subject matter of the case is a state secret, and those are generally
espionage cases involving secret contracts.

24.
25.
26.
27.

418 US. 683 (1974); see also supra note 20 and accompanying text.
See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705–06.
345 U.S. 1 (1953).
92 U.S. 105 (1875).
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That could change soon, if the Supreme Court reaches in any broad way
the state secrets privilege issues in the pending General Dynamics and
Boeing cases, 28 or if it grants certiorari, as perhaps at least one of my fellow
panel members hopes, in the Jeppesen Dataplan case. 29
Second, the scope of any state secrets privilege is broader in civil cases
than in criminal cases. The government will usually not be able to proceed
with a criminal prosecution if it is also invoking the state secrets privilege
as to relevant evidence or discovery. Moreover, criminal cases these days
generally address issues relating to classified information—including any
state secrets claim—through the process required under the Classified
Information Procedures Act. 30
Third, the law is fairly clear that courts should avoid reaching state
secrets claims whenever possible—Reynolds says as much. 31 The privilege
should be invoked by the government, then, only where truly necessary.
The 2009 Attorney General Policy confirms that the state secrets privilege
will only be invoked in limited circumstances where a significant risk to
national security is presented and after detailed procedures—including the
Attorney General’s personal approval—have been followed. 32 And if a
court has any other basis for resolving a case without reaching a state
secrets claim, it usually should do so.
Well, what if a district court cannot avoid reaching a state secrets claim?
What is then the district court’s obligation in addressing and resolving this
unique privilege claim? Generally, I think all would agree, a robust, careful
examination is required in order to make an independent judicial
determination that the information or matter at issue is—in fact and under
the law—privileged. The court must employ a careful yet skeptical eye,
particularly where the government is accused of engaging in
unconstitutional misconduct in serious violation of individual rights. That
examination entails, it seems to me, close judicial scrutiny at four places.
First, there are certain procedural requirements that must be met. The
court must demand compliance by the government with three procedural
requirements for invocation of the state secrets privilege that were
originally set out in Reynolds. There must be a formal claim of privilege by
an appropriate agency or department head after personal consideration. To
these I would add today that there should be compliance with the Attorney

28. The Supreme Court did not do so. See Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S.
Ct. 1900 (2011) (holding that when a court dismisses an affirmative defense to the
government’s allegations of breach of contract because of state secrets, the possession of
funds and property of the parties ought to be left as it was the day they filed suit).
29. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011).
30. Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980) (codified at 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1–16
(2006)).
31. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
32. Memorandum from Eric Holder, Attorney Gen. to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and
Agencies and Heads of Dep’t Components (Sept. 23, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/state-secret-privileges.pdf.
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General’s Policy. These issues are straightforward, usually resting on clear
affidavits, and need no further discussion here.
Second, the district court must ask whether the specific materials or
subject matters at issue actually contain or involve the sensitive state secrets
information that the government contends. This is the initial phase of the
robust judicial role. For cases in which the assertion of state secrets is truly
an evidentiary privilege, as in Reynolds, this should involve careful ex
parte, in camera review of the actual documents at issue. Indeed, the
Reynolds case illustrates why such careful examination is so important.
There, the courts did not review the actual document involved, which was a
single report. Many years later, when that document was declassified and
released, it became clear that it simply did not contain sensitive state secrets
information as the government had claimed.
The standard articulated in Reynolds, moreover, included reliance on a
“reasonable danger” that the document would reference state secrets.33
That standard, I think, may be misdirected, since Executive Branch officials
can claim no particular superiority over a federal judge when reviewing a
document to ascertain whether that document actually contains the type of
information it is claimed to contain. This aspect of Reynolds has not really
been applied much by later courts, although there has not been a subsequent
Supreme Court case that has modified it. But where specific documents
have been identified, it seems to me that the best course always should
include actual judicial review of the documents.
But there are cases in the category recognized by the Ninth Circuit in
Jeppesen Dataplan and the Fourth Circuit in El-Masri, where the Reynolds
evidentiary privilege and the Totten subject matter bar converge and a state
secrets privilege assertion may require dismissal because it is apparent
either that the case cannot proceed without the privileged evidence or that
continuing to litigate presents an unacceptable risk of disclosing state
secrets. Then this careful judicial review and assessment may have to be
based on affidavits from government officials outlining the types of
information the government says cannot be disclosed and why. Judges
must be sensitive here to the obligation to perform a careful, probing
analysis, even when encountering some resistance from the government,
which may wish to limit the detail provided even to the judge. The
problems are heightened when the government asserts the state secrets
privilege at an early point in the litigation, before discovery has begun or
specific sensitive materials are identified and, hence, before the option of
examining the underlying documents themselves can even be considered by
the district court. Some courts have stressed that it is the rare case where
dismissal under Reynolds is appropriate at the outset. But many of the
present-day settings in which the state secrets privilege is invoked will
probably continue to give rise to early state secrets claims by the
government. This is a primary point of disagreement regarding the Ninth

33. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
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Circuit’s Jeppesen Dataplan decision, as you will no doubt hear shortly
from the panelist to my left.
Third, the next aspect of the judicial assessment of whether the state
secrets privilege has been properly invoked asks whether the information in
the documents, or as outlined by the government in its classified affidavits,
is sufficiently sensitive to warrant protection—in other words, is it state
secrets as claimed? Here, considerable deference to the expertise of the
executive branch officials is warranted—particularly in military,
intelligence, and foreign affairs arenas. While the judicial role is still
important and must include careful assessment, appropriate deference to the
experts asserting the state secrets claims must be afforded. They will know
much more than the judge can be expected to know or will ever know. But
just how much deference could be impacted by the need for the material.
And classification of the material is not enough by itself. As the Ninth
Circuit acknowledged in Jeppesen Dataplan, the Supreme Court has plainly
instructed in Reynolds that the judicial role “cannot be abdicated to the
caprice of executive officers.” 34
Fourth and finally, if the resolution of all these inquiries supports the
government’s state secrets privilege claim, the court must decide how the
litigation will proceed, if at all. Some cases will simply require the
exclusion of discrete pieces of evidence and the case can proceed to trial.
But frequently it will be difficult to separate the state secrets information
from other non-sensitive information, and occasionally it may be that the
case cannot proceed and dismissal will be required. This assessment calls
for close examination of both the plaintiff’s claims and the defendant’s
defenses to ascertain whether the case can proceed fairly without the
disputed documents, or even without any inquiry into the area properly
determined to be subject to the state secrets claim. It is not enough to say
that the general subject matter is publicly known. A careful review of the
facts needed to support the specific claims and defenses is necessary to
determine whether further litigation would unjustifiably risk the disclosure
of state secrets, as both the Fourth Circuit in El-Masri and the Ninth Circuit
in Jeppesen Dataplan have noted. For those courts, the case cannot
proceed if litigation of the claims or defenses would, in the words of the
Ninth Circuit, be “so infused with state secrets that the risk of disclosing
them is both apparent and inevitable.”35 But dismissal without permitting a
plaintiff to present non-sensitive evidence in support of its case is an
extreme and highly controversial outcome. While the government’s
assessment certainly should receive some weight here, ultimately once
again this demands a careful, independent review by the district judge.
None of this is easy. And of course, the non-governmental party, as has
been mentioned, is often handicapped by less than full participation in the
process. Neither the precise role of the courts nor the applicable standards
are as yet fully developed.
34. Jeppesen Dataplan, 614 F.3d at 1082 (quoting Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9–10).
35. Id. at 1089.
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State secrets claims often occur at the nub of the tension between
protecting national security and preserving individual rights, particularly
where serious government misconduct is alleged. Therefore, they tend to
be difficult and often controversial.
For now, pending further guidance from higher courts, I would agree
with the en banc majority of the Ninth Circuit in Jeppesen Dataplan to this
extent—that is, that “it is the district court’s role to use its fact-finding and
other tools to full advantage before it concludes that the rare step of
dismissal is justified.” 36
PROF. CAPRA: Thank you, Judge. Ben Wizner.
MR. WIZNER: Thanks, Dan. It is a real honor to be included in this
illustrious panel—that does include you too, Doug.
Unlike Judge Sack, regrettably, I am an expert on the state secrets
privilege. I never intended to be, did not set out to be, and would rather be
an expert on the issues that we are trying to litigate in these cases, but,
because of Doug and his cronies, we have had to litigate the state secrets
question again and again.
I think I will not get into a lot of detail about the cases and will save
some time for our panel discussion. I do not agree with everything that was
just said. I do agree that I am to your left. I am going to make three broad
points that I hope can frame the discussion that we have afterwards, rather
than getting into too much detail about the cases.
In February of 2008, I was in federal court in San Jose in the Jeppesen
case, which was just being discussed, arguing against one of Doug’s
colleagues, who was asserting that the case needed to be dismissed at the
pleading stage. The basis for that dismissal was an affidavit by former CIA
Director Michael Hayden, saying that the allegations of this case were so
secret that they could not be confirmed or denied. The affidavit stated that
the interrogation techniques that were alleged, relations with other
nations—really everything about the case, including stuff that we believed
was known to the public—were too secret to be litigated in that court.
Well, on exactly the same day across the country testifying before the
Senate was Michael Hayden himself, where he was disclosing officially for
the first time that the CIA had used the highly secret technique of
waterboarding against three detainees in CIA custody. 37 Just two months
before that testimony, General Hayden had written in a letter to CIA
employees that the CIA had destroyed ninety-two interrogation tapes
depicting so-called “enhanced” interrogation techniques because the CIA
had determined that those tapes were not relevant to any ongoing
congressional or judicial proceeding.
Let me give you one other introductory example along these lines. This
comes from the Al-Aulaqi case that Professor Capra referred to. 38 This was
36. Id. at 1092–93.
37. Current and Projected Threats to the National Security: Hearing Before the S.
Select Comm. on Intelligence, 110th Cong. 71–72 (2008) (statement of Michael Hayden,
Director, CIA).
38. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010).
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a case that was attempting to set some limits on the authority of the
Executive Branch to use lethal force against a U.S. citizen away from a
battlefield and without due process. Now, how did we know that Anwar
Al-Aulaqi was being targeted with lethal force? Well, we knew that
because the Executive Branch, in an apparently coordinated media strategy,
had decided to advise the nation’s leading newspapers that Al-Aulaqi’s
death had been approved by the National Security Council and by the
President. Why did they do that? Why did they leak that information?
Well, who knows? Was it to demonstrate how tough they were after the
failed Christmas Day attack over Detroit? Was it to promote some other
political reason? Was there a national security reason? We do not know.
But following that disclosure, we attempted to litigate the implications of
that information, and the government turned around and said, “This cannot
be litigated.” In affidavits from the Secretary of Defense, they said:
“[D]isclosure of whether or not lethal force has been authorized to combat a
terrorist organization overseas, and, if so, the specific targets of such action
. . . [would provide the nation’s enemies with] critical information needed
to evade hostile action” 39—precisely the information that the Executive
Branch had just, in a coordinated way, provided to leading newspapers. 40
These really glaring juxtapositions between public disclosure in one
forum and claims of secrecy in another forum in my view typify the
government’s much more malleable and expedient approach to secrecy and
accountability than they would like us to believe. All too often, if
information is needed to hold government officials accountable in a civil
case, or if it might even be relevant to a criminal investigation of
government officials, it is withheld, or in some cases even destroyed. If,
however, that same information or evidence might be useful politically to
the Executive Branch, or might have to be disclosed in order to pave the
way for prosecutions, or even executions, of terrorism suspects, then the
same evidence can be revealed and will be revealed without any harm to
national security.
I think this is an important frame for the discussion because so much of
the debate about the state secrets privilege revolves around the notion of
“judicial competence”—about whether judges have the institutional
expertise to protect national security and to determine the import of
allegedly secret evidence. I think this is really the wrong answer to the
wrong question. The wrong answer because I would stack the record of the
federal judiciary on national security questions against the record of the
CIA any day of the week, and I think the judges would come out on top.
Every single day in Washington, there is a crime wave of leaks of classified
information to newspapers, and none of it comes from judges; it comes
from Executive Branch officials, and it comes from Congress. I think it is
39. Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in
Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 50, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1
(2010) (No. 10-cv-1469), 2010 WL 3863135.
40. See, e.g., Dana Priest, U.S. Playing a Key Role in Yemen Attacks, WASH. POST, Jan.
27, 2010, at A1.
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the wrong question because what gets ignored in all of this discussion about
who is more competent to make these determinations is what is a far more
serious question, and that is the question of the structural conflict of interest
when you have the Executive Branch—which is itself being accused of
wrongdoing, and in some of our cases criminality—submitting affidavits
demanding dismissal of cases on national security grounds. Under this
doctrine—and it is the existing doctrine—a torture victim can be denied his
day in court on the basis of an affidavit submitted by the architect of his
abuse and torture.
What I am going to say next sometimes raises eyebrows, but maybe it
does not anymore. That is that every single case since 9/11 that has sought
to hold U.S. officials accountable for torture, every single one of those
cases, has been dismissed at the pleading stage without any adjudication of
either the facts or the law. These courts are not saying that the alleged
conduct is lawful. These courts are not saying that the allegations in the
complaint are not credible. Neither of those questions is being considered.
Instead, because of a threshold issue—all too often an invocation of the
state secrets privilege—the cases are being dismissed without any
resolution of those issues at all. This, of course, is a tragedy for the victims
but, I think, also a problem for our system in that we are deprived of having
a final resolution by the branch of government that is most suited to make
that.
Now why am I raising this point? This is really, I think, the second broad
point that I want to make today. This is another canard that you often hear
in the state secrets discussion. Maybe I should not call it a canard because
maybe Doug is about to make this point. But it is certainly a trope of this
debate. That is that, regrettably, we are so sorry this is the case, but there
are times when the interest of individual litigants must be subordinated to
the greater good, the greater public interest, and the national security. Well
that formula might hold true in a standard tort case like Reynolds where
there is no allegation of illegal government conduct. But I would submit
that it is quite different in a torture case. There is a significant public
interest in ensuring that executive actions comply with the law, with our
Constitution. There is a significant public interest in preserving the role of
an active judiciary as an arbiter of whether other branches have complied
with the law. So you do not have a scenario where the public interest sits
on one side and the private interests sit on the other. I would say that, at
best, there are public interests on both sides of the equation, and that in the
cases that I am discussing now the public interest is overwhelmingly on the
side of the plaintiffs.
That brings me to the third point here. If I have not made this clear
enough, I believe that the government often invokes the state secrets
privilege not to protect national security, but to protect government officials
from legal accountability. But even if we were to accept that the purported
secrets at the heart of these cases are indeed legitimate secrets and should
be withheld, why does it follow that the burden of the state secrets privilege
should fall wholly on the plaintiff, on the victim? In a torture case, why
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should the alleged perpetrator of torture be permitted, number one, to block
disclosure of evidence and, number two, to pay nothing to the victim and to
walk away? This is really a perverse incentive, where there is no cost
whatsoever to the government in invoking the privilege and every reason to
do so. Why not have a rule that in cases in which the government or its
agent is a party and plaintiffs have raised serious allegations of grave
executive misconduct—such as the kidnapping and torture claims that are at
the heart of some of our cases—why not compel the government to bear
some of the cost of its invocation of the state secrets privilege?
Now, the argument that you might hear in response to this proposal is
that we have to prevent the graymailing of the government. If a plaintiff
could recover against the CIA simply by suing and alleging torture and
expecting that there would be a state secrets invocation and get money, why
wouldn’t everybody do that? But I actually think that that is a fear that is
overblown and one that could be addressed. You could set up some kind of
framework, along the lines of Title VII, where the plaintiff is required to
make some kind of prima facie showing before shifting the burden to the
government. But the system as it exists right now allows the government to
engage in torture, to declare it a state secret, and, by virtue of that
designation alone, to avoid any judicial accountability for conduct that even
the government purports to assert is illegal in all circumstances.
Whatever you think of the state secrets privilege, the government should
not have a privilege to violate our most fundamental rights and get away
with it.
PROF. CAPRA: Thanks, Ben. Doug Letter.
MR. LETTER: Thank you. I will start out by saying what I am required
to at all of these types of appearances. I am appearing here in my individual
capacity. I am not speaking here as a representative of the United States or
the Department of Justice. Everybody I hope took that note down.
A couple of things that I just need to start out with. First of all, this is
going to be an interesting experiment that you are all participating in.
Normally when I appear before Judge Bates and Judge Sack, by now they
would have interrupted me and asked piercing sorts of questions. They
might listen to the answers; they might not.
JUDGE SACK: Would you like us to provide a little reality for you?
MR. LETTER: And by the way, I do have to note Judge Sack was on a
panel that ruled against me earlier this week.
Professor Capra said he was in the class ahead of me in law school but
we had not met before. What he did not say is I actually knew of him.
There is a shrine at Berkeley to one of the top students who ever graced the
halls.
PROF. CAPRA: Thanks, Doug.
MR. LETTER: I used to worship in front of that.
Switching to a serious note for a moment, I have litigated a number of
cases against Ben. He is one of the most superb advocates in the United
States today for the clients that he represents. I hope that at least the law
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students here can use him as a model of somebody to emulate, because it is
truly an honor for me to litigate against him.
I have one overall point to make in response to the three presentations
here, which is the Attorney General and the Justice Department welcome
the full participation, skepticism, et cetera, of the Article III judiciary in the
state secrets arena. We believe that it is an absolutely essential part of this
mechanism—absolutely essential. The independent Article III judiciary is,
as you all know, one of the key bulwarks of our democracy, and we very
firmly believe that it has an essential role to play in the state secrets realm.
As Judge Bates knows from personal experience and I know from the
various cases that I have litigated, unlike in the time of Reynolds—I am
fairly sure I could say this accurately—in every state secrets case I have
been involved in, and that is quite a few, we have presented to the
independent Article III judge or judges a massive amount of material. We
do not do this pursuant to some sort of court order; we do not do it
grudgingly, trying to hide things, et cetera. We do this because we consider
that it is a key part of this process. I think many of you would be
astonished at the depth of material that we often provide to the judiciary.
And by the way, just so you know, Department of Justice Regulations
provide that Article III judges do not need any security clearance. If the
material is relevant for the case so the judge has a need to know, we provide
it automatically—and I am talking about material that is extremely highly
classified. For instance, in the Jeppesen case, no law clerks were cleared,
no court personnel were cleared. The judges were. And this is material
that, because it was so highly classified, had to be handled by couriers, et
cetera, who provided it to the judges for their use and their use alone.
I fear that much of the public—and I fear actually much of the judiciary
and much of the bar—has an enormous misconception about how this
system works. There seems to be this notion that the government walks
into court and says, “State secrets, case over,” and everybody just says, “Oh
gosh, we are done.” It does not work that way at all. We provide, as I said,
an immense amount of detail—very, very lengthy declarations.
Now obviously, from Ben’s perspective, he sees the allegations in the
complaint that he has either written or colleagues of his have done, and
often that is all that he sees. This is regrettable, clearly.
MR. WIZNER: I agree.
MR. LETTER: And clearly it is regrettable, and clearly this should not
be the norm, this should be the extremely rare case—and it is. The number
of state secrets cases that we have is tiny. We do this only when it is
absolutely necessary. Otherwise, the Attorney General fully and firmly
believes in an adversarial system. So you have to keep this all in
perspective, what a small number of cases this is and how far we go in
trying to educate the judiciary.
Another point that I want to make clear—as Ben well knows, when he
and I argued the Jeppesen cases in the Ninth Circuit en banc—at a certain
point the judges went into a secure area and I alone went with them. Ben
was not allowed to participate in that because it was about an hour-long
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discussion of the actual material. The judges were pressing me for about an
hour about the specific material. This is not something where we just say,
as I said before, “State secrets, judge, make the case go away.” That is not
the way it works. The judges probe.
Ben mentioned the appearance he made in San Jose before Judge Ware.
Our view was that Judge Ware was extremely skeptical of our claims. We
had the impression that he was: “Whoa! You are asking me to do what?
You are asking me to dismiss this case at the outset given these
allegations?” We did not threaten Judge Ware. We did not bribe him. We
presented him with a massive amount of material and he was convinced, as
were the majority of judges on the Ninth Circuit, as were the judges in cases
like El-Masri, Al-Haramain, 41 Edmonds, et cetera.
Now, one thing I do want to pick up on: as was mentioned here, Judge
Bates ruled on the Al-Aulaqi case. 42 In Al-Aulaqi the government did assert
the state secrets privilege. However, as Judge Bates indicated, right there in
Attorney General Holder’s Policy is that the privilege will be asserted “only
[when] necessary.” 43 The government there made a series of arguments
why the case was not justiciable, wholly aside from the state secrets
privilege. However, we had one motion to dismiss. We had only one shot
at this. So we also asserted the privilege. We said very clearly to Judge
Bates that we strongly urged him not to reach the state secrets issue unless
he had to, meaning unless he denied our arguments on the other
justiciability grounds.
Judge Bates—in our view very correctly—ruled in a lengthy opinion that
the case was non-justiciable for various reasons, and he therefore declined
to even get into the state secrets privilege. In our view, this is exactly right.
Again, we are not trying to come in and shut down cases on the state
secrets privilege if it is not necessary, if there are other ways that the case
can be resolved without causing problems for national security. This is why
Judge Sack gave an extremely interesting recounting of the Pentagon
Papers case. The cases that I have litigated—the state secrets cases—are so
precisely different because, as I pointed out, in all of them we have made
presentations to the judges and the judges themselves have said—unlike in
the Pentagon Papers case, where they said, “Why can’t this be
published?”—in every one of the cases I have litigated, the judges have
said, “You are right. You have convinced me. This is regrettable.”
I strongly urge you to read Judge Fisher’s majority opinion for the en
banc Ninth Circuit in Jeppesen.
MR. WIZNER: Should they read the dissent too?
MR. LETTER: Yes, you should also read the dissent. It is very clear
that Judge Fisher, who was Associate Attorney General in the Clinton
Administration before being named to the Ninth Circuit, is extremely
uncomfortable with dismissing that case. And yet it is also clear—and he
41. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2007).
42. 727 F. Supp. 2d 1.
43. Memorandum, supra note 32, at 1.
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says this a number of times: “We pored over this material, we were
skeptical, we looked at it in great depth, and this is how we came out.”
Now Ben made a very interesting suggestion about if the government
claims privilege in a torture case that something should shift or maybe some
money should be paid. That would be awful public policy. You definitely
do not want that. Remember that the officials who work for the President
that you have elected—this is a democratic system, if you do not like what
the President has done with the state secrets privilege, you vote him out of
office—the President has appointed officials who you expect to protect
national security. You do not want the head of the CIA or the head of the
FBI or the Secretary of State—let us take the Secretary of State as an
example—to say to herself: “I ought to assert the state secrets privilege. I
should, national security demands it, but it will cost us a lot of money under
Ben’s proposal. The budget is extremely tight. I am not going to do it.”
You do not want the Secretary of State making that kind of balance. What
you want the Secretary of State doing is saying: “The privilege is
demanded here to protect national security, and my lawyers will prove that
to independent Article III judges.” If that happens, why do you want your
government to pay money?
Now—and this is where Judge Fisher’s opinion is terrific—one of the
things, if you look at it you will see, and something that, as Ben knows—he
actually asked me twice about it during the oral argument—are there other
remedies? And as Judge Fisher points out, yes, there are. If Congress
wishes to pay money through an appropriation, Congress can do that. So if
Congress wishes to override the executive and the judiciary and say,
“Nevertheless, we want to pay money,” Congress can do that. So this is
just a question of—as Judge Fisher made clear—one remedy that is being
removed, not all.
Judge Sack made an extremely interesting suggestion: could you have a
neutral lawyer in there? This is something that is written about quite a bit
and is discussed in considerable length in the academic debate on this. I am
not sure if Judge Sack is aware; a British trial judge actually tried this in a
case where the British government asserted privilege. 44 The trial judge
said, “I am going to have a public advocate in who will be cleared.” In the
British system, with barristers, it is easy, because a barrister may one day
represent the government and the next day represent clients like Ben, so
they play both sides of the street constantly. The trial judge said, “That is
what I am going to do.” The British court of appeals overruled him, said he
could not do that because—and obviously one can debate if this is the
correct result or not—they said, “We will not allow secret litigation.”45
Remember, the state secrets privilege removes the evidence from the case.
If that means the case has to be dismissed, it is dismissed. But the British
appellate court decided, “We do not want the case to proceed, to be litigated
44. See Al Rawi v. Sec. Serv., [2009] EWHC (QB) 2959, [4], [91]–[96] (Eng.), rev’d,
[2010] EWCA (Civ) 482 (Eng.), aff’d, [2011] UKSC 34.
45. See Al Rawi v. Sec. Serv., [2010] EWCA (Civ) 482, [11], [30] (Eng.), aff’d, [2011]
UKSC 34.
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in secret.” Again, you can debate whether that is the correct result or not,
but I thought I would raise that because this very idea has been tried in
Britain.
The one last point I want to make, because I really do want to get to the
questions and the debate, is—I feel sort of rude doing this, but I have to,
despite the fact that I am in the home of the Second Circuit and Judge Sack
is here. One of the things that Professor Capra asked me to talk about is: is
the Attorney General’s new policy working? It is very well—except the
Second Circuit has caused a serious problem.
The Second Circuit in a case called Aref 46 has ruled that the state secrets
privilege applies in criminal cases. We think that this is a very broad
mistake, and we have told the Second Circuit this. When the opinion came
down, we could not seek rehearing because we actually won; the criminal
conviction was affirmed. But we filed a motion saying to the Second
Circuit judges, “We believe you are incorrect and you ought to change this
part of the opinion.” 47 The Second Circuit has held that the state secrets
privilege applies in criminal cases under CIPA, the Classified Information
Procedure Act. We have argued that cannot be correct because the
Supreme Court said in Reynolds the state secrets privilege is absolute. That
means there is no balancing. It does not matter if the other side said, “But I
really, really need this information.” In that sense it is like the attorneyclient privilege. You cannot say, “Well, this is a murder prosecution so we
are going to call the attorney to the stand. This is really important.” You
cannot do that. State secrets privilege—you cannot do that.
What the Second Circuit held in Aref is the state secrets privilege applies
in a criminal case, but, they said, pursuant to the Roviaro 48 standard, which
means you do a balancing. 49 In our view this does not make sense. This
has caused actually very serious problems for the government, because we
have a lot of criminal cases involving classified information—not state
secrets information necessarily, classified information—and yet the Second
Circuit has forced very high-level government officials to go through this
procedure, which we think is incorrect. No other court is doing this.
JUDGE SACK: Would you like to name at least one Second Circuit
judge who was not on the panel?
MR. LETTER: Judge Sack was not on the panel.
PROF. CAPRA: Judge Bates.
JUDGE BATES: In order to ensure a robust independent judicial role
and review, I have always found it helpful to have law clerks cleared. I
always have law clerks cleared for every level of matter, no matter how
sensitive. I think that is something that judges need to keep in mind as well
as the Department of Justice.

46. United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2008).
47. See generally Memorandum of the U.S. in Support of Its Motion to Amend the
Court’s July 2, 2008 Opinion, Aref, 533 F.3d 72 (No. 07-0981).
48. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
49. Aref, 533 F.3d at 79–80.
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MR. LETTER: Right, and we do often.
PROF. CAPRA: But if you can clear a law clerk, why can’t you clear
Ben? Why can’t Ben be in that? I want to clear Ben. Judge Sack’s point is
that the adversarial argument in front of the judge in camera is important.
So wouldn’t you want to clear somebody who could be cleared, provided
security clearance, who was arguing for the plaintiff in that case?
MR. WIZNER: If I had a former CIA general counsel on my team.
MR. LETTER: Right, and that is obviously the best argument, as Ben
knows. A couple of problems with it. And by the way, I am going to be
really stupid here for a minute and attack the entire federal judiciary. First,
we have had, most sadly, leaks of classified information by judges. In fact,
in one very difficult case we had to get the court of appeals to mandamus
the judge to pull back the classified material. And we have litigators who
have leaked information, unfortunately—I hope inadvertently—but it
happens a lot.
JUDGE BATES: But it has never happened that anyone in the
Department of Justice has leaked anything?
MR. LETTER: Never. But what Judge Bates said, I think, in part,
makes my point. You want to keep as few as possible people who are
cleared, because otherwise you increase the likelihood of problems. In
addition, Professor Capra, an excellent question as some of the courts have
noted. There is a very serious issue here if someone like Ben—or even
worse, a criminal defense attorney, which happens plenty—is cleared, how
do they deal with their client? The problems, I think, are immense.
PROF. CAPRA: Judge Sack?
JUDGE SACK: I want to say something that both Judge Bates and I
mentioned before in terms of the dynamics of this sort of proceeding. I am
a judge. Assume I have before me something that the government says
must be kept secret. Assume it made the decision in good faith, has dotted
the i’s and crossed the t’s, including getting the real signature of the
Attorney General and not just a rubber-stamp facsimile.
MR. LETTER: No, no, the actual signature always.
JUDGE SACK: Assume all that. Then I get all this stuff, and I am the
judge, and I am reading this, and I am thinking: “Well, all of these people
have said that public disclosure would be a disaster, the whole nation is
going to fall apart. As a judge, how do I know? Maybe I am giving away
the secret of cold fusion to the Taliban. I do not want to be the one who did
that! There is enormous pressure—inherent pressure—on the judge not to
disclose what he or she is sternly warned must, in the national interest, be
maintained in confidence. The government says, “We are the experts, and
disclosure would be a terrible thing.” It is very, very difficult for a judge to
say, “Well, I will allow it to become public anyhow.”
I am not saying the government is not always right. It may be. I am
saying that if the judge is going to be wrong, he or she will almost always
err on the government’s side. That is precisely the reason—not the only
reason, but one of the reasons—that I am concerned about the description
that you give of government counsel disappearing into a “secure area” with
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the entire en banc Ninth Circuit without anybody there with them to take
the other side of the case. One of our problems is that we are under an
inherent pressure to do what you tell us is so important for us to do.
MR. WIZNER: I just want to respond to a few points that Doug made.
One gets the sense when listening to the government lawyers who in good
faith invoke state secrets privilege that if only we knew what they knew,
this would be very clear, and that we are all operating under this collective
misconception about what is really at stake.
I would just point out that that en banc Ninth Circuit comprised of eleven
judges divided six to five. Six agreed with Doug; five agreed with me.
Now, those five also saw the documents and believed that—at least at this
stage of the litigation—it was premature to make the determination that the
case had to be thrown out. So it is not as cut and dried.
I was a little surprised by your response to my suggestion about burden
sharing, and I think it actually takes a dim view of public officials. I could
not imagine a Secretary of State, or any other Cabinet official, being
lackadaisical about national security to save a little money that might go to
a victim of government abuse.
MR. LETTER: I did not mean that.
MR. WIZNER: Well, I think so. You do not want a rule that might give
any incentive to a government official to do anything other than take the
most expansive view of state secrets. But I would say that you have to look
at the other side of these issues. Assume, as you should, that a victim in
this case—call him El-Masri—was an innocent citizen strolling down the
street and in a case of mistaken identity was snatched up, chained to the
floor of a plane, flown to a country he had never been to, held in a dungeon
for five months, tortured, and dropped on a hilltop. The question is, should
the government, even if there are legitimate secrets at play, be able to
invoke an evidentiary privilege and then give this person nothing? Is there
not another way?
I am saying protect the secret. If it is a real secret, protect the secret. But
why do you also have to give this person nothing? I do not think it is an
awful idea.
MR. LETTER: But, Ben, that is a public policy decision to be made by
Congress, not judges.
MR. WIZNER: What if Congress has already made it by legislating a
statute called the Alien Tort Statute,50 that makes enforceable in federal
court serious human rights violations? It is not as if Congress has not acted
here. This was the very interesting question we had in the Ninth Circuit.
Judge Fisher and others said, “Why don’t you go to Congress and get a
private bill?” My colleague Jameel Jaffer, who was sitting next to me,
whispered and said, “How about a public bill?” And there are public bills.
There is the Torture Victim Protection Act.51 There is the Alien Tort
Statute. It is not as if this stuff does not exist.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
51. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note).
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MR. LETTER: But, Ben, you are twisting it. You know neither of those
statutes says, “Mr. El-Masri was done wrong and deserves money.” You
are raising a broad point. As we know, if Congress wants to pay Mr. ElMasri money, it is free to do that.
MR. WIZNER: Okay, fair enough. Two more very short points in
response. There is an interesting point that you make about how secret
litigation is disfavored. But it seems like your proposed remedy for that is
no litigation. No one here, at least on my side, is advocating secret
litigation. We prefer it to no litigation if it means no remedy for the
victims. This is something that Judge Sack’s colleague, Judge Jacobs,
wrote in the Arar case, 52 another case on behalf of a torture victim, where
Judge Jacobs said because some of these proceedings might have to happen
in secret and because secret proceedings are disfavored, better for us just to
not recognize a cause of action at all; it will make the judiciary look better.
It is an extraordinary argument. I also share a suspicion of secret
proceedings, but I think in cases like this, where the choice is some kind of
closed proceeding with security clearances or nothing for a victim, I would
choose secret proceedings.
I would also say, just finally, that the government has itself to blame for
some of its credibility problems on these issues. I was sitting in a military
commission court in Guantanamo during proceedings in the Hamdan
trial. 53 Hamdan, remember, was Osama bin Laden’s driver. Hamdan’s
lawyer said, “Look, there are people here in Guantanamo in a prison cell
who could tell the court and the jury what Hamdan’s role was. You have
the 9/11 plotters who are sitting over there. Why not give them written
questions and let them answer what was Hamdan’s role, was he a bigwig or
was he a small guy in al Qaeda?”
The government lawyer said, “This is the highest-level top-secret
information in the government. We are talking about planes flying into
buildings.” This is what was said in the court. “If you give any access to
these people, it is going to be on you, judge.”
The Navy captain who was presiding said: “No. I think I will give the
access. I will let them write questions to these people. I will look at the
answers and I will provide them.” The government did not even appeal.
And you wonder why people are skeptical of the kind of rhetoric the
government uses.
MR. LETTER: Come on, Ben. Things are much more complicated than
they seem on the surface often.
MR. WIZNER: On that?
JUDGE BATES: Just a couple of comments and I will pick on Doug
some more, but not exclusively. I think Congress’s role should be not in
the public bill approach but in setting some broader guidelines with respect
to state secrets. There is room for legislation here. There is room for some
52. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
53. For the Supreme Court decision relating to these proceedings, see Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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tinkering with the doctrine as it exists, as developed by the courts. And
certainly, it is not for the judges to do all of this.
Now, with respect to whether a lawyer like Ben could be cleared, I think
if you look at the Guantanamo cases, you do have a model for that to some
extent, where there is a problem in terms of communications with clients—
and there it is a particularly difficult problem because the clients are down
at Guantanamo and under very tight security and access is limited. But
there are circumstances where the lawyers are cleared into certain
information that cannot be shared with the clients, and that same approach
could exist in cases beyond those habeas corpus proceedings dealing with
Guantanamo detainees.
Secret proceedings do not seem to me to be something that anyone
should advocate for. The less of that, the better. But it is happening a lot.
It did not only happen in Jeppesen Dataplan. It may have happened in ElMasri. I do not know.
MR. WIZNER: Yes.
JUDGE BATES: In virtually every Guantanamo habeas corpus case,
there is some secret proceeding—usually involving the lawyers for the
detainee, however, but secret from the public—that takes place both at the
district court, because of the classified information and the level of the
classified information involved—even secret information would not be
public, obviously, but often it is a much higher level that is involved—and
then at the court of appeals. In the D.C. Circuit there is often a two-stage
proceeding, with a public argument and then everyone is excused from the
courtroom and there is an additional argument that takes place. But again,
there are lawyers for both sides at the proceeding. Whether that is a good
idea in terms of even that degree of secrecy or not, I am not really going to
opine on. But it certainly is something that is happening a lot.
PROF. CAPRA: Judge Sack, who would like a rebuttal of a particular
point.
JUDGE SACK: No. What I want to do is toot my own horn.
PROF. CAPRA. Okay, fair enough—to toot his own horn on a particular
point.
JUDGE SACK: In response to this opinion of Chief Judge Jacobs to
which you made mention, I said, amongst many other things:
[T]he majority professes concern about “[t]he Court’s reliance on
information that cannot be introduced into the public record,” which the
Court says “is likely to be a common feature of any Bivens actions arising
in the context of alleged extraordinary rendition.” The majority thinks
that this concern “should provoke hesitation, given the strong preference
in the Anglo-American legal tradition for open court proceedings.”
We applaud the majority’s recognition of the fundamental importance
of the principle that courts are presumed to be open. It respects this
Circuit’s history of meticulously guarding constitutional protection for
“access to the courts” in the sense of the ability of a citizen to see and
hear, and in that way to participate in, the workings of the justice system.
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But it follows not at all, we think, from the presumption of openness
however gauged that the open nature of the federal courts is properly
weighed as a factor in the Bivens analysis. . . . We regularly hear, on the
basis of partially or totally sealed records, not only cases implicating
national security or diplomatic concerns, but those involving criminal
defendants’ cooperation with prosecutors, other criminal matters,
probation department reports, upon which federal criminal sentences are
to a significant extent typically based, child welfare, trade secrets, and any
manner of other criminal and civil matters. Hardly a week goes by in our
collective experience in which some document or fact is not considered
by a panel of this Court out of the public eye.
We accommodate the public interest in proceedings before federal
courts by rigorously adhering to the presumption of openness, but the
presumption is often overcome. The majority’s notion that because the
presumption is likely to be overcome in a particular species of case we
should therefore foreclose a remedy or otherwise limit our jurisdiction in
order to accommodate the public suspicion of secrecy, is misconceived.
Denying relief to an entire class of persons with presumably legitimate
claims in part because some of their number may lose in proceedings that
are held in secret or because secrets may cause some such claims to fail,
makes little sense to us. It could work endless mischief were courts to
turn their backs on such cases, their litigants, and the litigants’ asserted
rights.
We are not aware of any other area of our jurisprudence where the
ability to overcome the presumption of openness has been relied upon to
deny a remedy to a litigant. 54

PROF. CAPRA: We are running late, but I promised to open it up to a
couple of questions.
QUESTION: It seems in everyone’s interest to have these issues
litigated. Isn’t there a way to either have a set of stipulated facts or have a
framed issue hearing, or say, “Look, we are not going to say that this person
was waterboarded, but we will admit that someone has been waterboarded
and we want to know whether waterboarding is unconstitutional or not?” It
seems to be in everyone’s interest, including the government, to get those
questions answered. You two seem incredibly bright, even though you are
each obviously on opposite sides of this. But it seems like the two of you
could come up with a way to get these issues litigated.
JUDGE BATES: What you are expressing to some extent sounds like a
congressional hearing. That is a way to publicly, if you will, explore that
kind of an issue.
QUESTION: But I am saying there needs to be a holding by a judge.
The problem with a congressional hearing is you do not know if it is
unconstitutional or not, and Ben is saying, “I need to know because my
client either was deprived of his constitutional rights or not.”
MR. LETTER: First of all, you are right, government attorneys have a
responsibility to the public. I always, always serve the public interest as
54. Arar, 585 F.3d at 609–10 (Sack, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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determined by the Congress of the United States and the President of the
United States, who are popularly elected. I am never freelancing, I am
never hiding things to hide them, et cetera. Never, not once.
Second, where I started, remember: we do not come in and say, “State
secrets, shut down the case.” We go to an independent Article III judge and
we say, “We do not think this particular case can be litigated and here is
why.” We somehow, crazy as it is, convince skeptical Article III
independent judges—liberals, conservatives, all different stripes—that
actually the case cannot be litigated.
All I can do is say there is your answer. All of these Article III judges,
who are totally independent of the President, have agreed with us. Where
we have said the case cannot be litigated, the majority in each panel has
agreed.
PROF. CAPRA: I guess my experience is—I am a Special Master in a
matter, so I will read a plaintiff’s brief on whatever motion. I will say, “Oh
my God, how could I not rule in favor of the plaintiff?” Then I read the
defendant’s brief and I say, “Oh my God, how could I not rule in favor of
the defendant?”
I am sure you make excellent submissions. I guess the concern that has
been expressed tonight is they are excellent, but the issue is, is there some
way we can get the adversarial process in it? Maybe not. That is the
question for tonight.
QUESTION: Would you support legislation that codifies what the
Justice Department already apparently does, providing plentiful discovery
to judges in camera where Reynolds does not actually require it? If that is
good practice, should that be written into law so that we can have
confidence that that is happening?
PROF. CAPRA: That is a good question. Anybody want to talk?
MR. LETTER: The Attorney General’s Policy so provides. The Justice
Department has not at this point, I believe, commented one way or the other
on proposed legislation. The Attorney General said, “We are doing it,” and
it is Justice Department policy, and we always do it. Frankly, we always
did it before, also. But as I say, the Justice Department has not taken a
position.
MR. WIZNER: Well, they have actually. The House and Senate held
hearings on state secrets legislation, asked for the Administration to send a
witness to testify, and the Administration did not.
MR. LETTER: Right. But they did not take a position.
MR. WIZNER: There is a way in which you can say that is not taking a
position and there is another, more accurate way in which you can say that
that is killing a bill. So, yeah, they are not going to support it. In fact, the
Attorney General’s new guidelines, which are laudable as far as they go,
were really intended to take the wind out of the sails of the legislative
momentum. Of course the Executive Branch would rather have voluntary
self-policing guidelines instead of having Congress step in and say, “In
every case the court has to look beyond the affidavit.”
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JUDGE SACK: Please read the last part of the guidelines.
MR. WIZNER: “This policy statement is not intended to, and does not,
create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or
in equity, by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies,
or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.” 55
PROF. CAPRA: So the question that is being discussed here is: is it
actionable or not? That is a common point. Doug is right about that.
MR. WIZNER: But you are quite right, that legislation is necessary. It
would be useful. The government would still win most of these cases, as
Judge Sack pointed out, but it would prevent at least the fraud cases, and it
would require the government to go through the exercise of presenting
evidence and not just affidavits to judges in these cases, and I think that
would be very helpful.
QUESTION: This is a question I have for the judges on the panel. Isn’t
it your responsibility in every case, in order to prevent the government from
making wrongful claims of privilege, to examine the documents for which
state secrets privilege is asserted? In other words, why would it ever be
right for you to simply rely on a statement of a government official without
making sure the documents justify the statement?
JUDGE SACK: I have an easy answer: it beats the hell out of me. It
isn’t right for us simply to rely on the statement of a government official. I
do think the documents should be available to the court, they should be
examined in every case, and I think that Reynolds is wrong in not saying
that.
JUDGE BATES: I certainly agree that Reynolds was wrong in not
saying that in the way it played out. The difficult case, and the one that
these gentlemen are dealing with in many settings, is the case where the
privilege is asserted early on; there are no specific documents that have
been identified, the documents may in fact be hundreds of documents that
deal with extraordinary rendition, or the military and political decisionmaking that went into deciding to target a U.S. citizen overseas, if that
happened, with a drone attack. There are lots and lots of documents and
information that could be gleaned from the officials involved through
depositions.
So it is not always as simple as saying, “Yes, the judge should look at the
documents.” It may be that, when the privilege is asserted early on, that is a
very difficult thing to accomplish, and the government will fight very hard
to say: “You cannot do that and you do not need to do that, because here is
why, based on affidavits from the head of the CIA, the Director of National
Intelligence, et cetera. All this information we can summarize for you and
it is the sound basis for state secrets.” That is where it is a hard decision. If
there are specific documents identified, I do not think it is a hard decision at
all. The judge should look at the documents.
PROF. CAPRA: This was fun. Thank you very much for coming.

55. Memorandum, supra note 32, at 4.

